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ABSTRACT
Technological standards allow manufacturers and consumers to rely
upon these agreed-upon basic systems to facilitate sales and further
invention. However, where these standards involved patented technol-
ogy, the process of standard-setting raises many concerns at the inter-
section of antitrust and patent law. As patent holders advocate for their
patents to become part of technological standards, how should courts
police this activity to prevent patent holdup and other anti-competitive
practices? This Note explores the differing approaches to remedies em-
ployed by the United States International Trade Commission and the
United States District Courts where standard-essential patents are in-
fringed. This Note further proposes that both adjudicative bodies
should utilize the public policy prongs of their respective analyses to
deny injunctive relief where an entity has previously pledged to license
its standard-essential patent and fails to undergo appropriate negotia-
tions prior to bringing a patent infringement suit.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the United States International Trade Commission (“USITC”)
entered the epic Apple-Samsung patent litigation battle when it found Apple
infringed one of Samsung’s 3G-related standard-essential patents.1 In this
ruling, the USITC granted Samsung the only remedy available to this adjudi-
cative body: exclusionary relief.2 However, Samsung had previously agreed
to license this patented technology to third parties on “fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory terms.” Given this agreement, should Samsung have the
right to prevent Apple from using its technology where there is no evidence
that Apple rejected a fairly calculated license? This Note focuses on appro-
priate judicial remedies for infringement of patents subject to similar
agreements.3
1. Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable
Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, 78 Fed.
Reg. 34,669, 671 (June 4, 2013) (Final) [hereinafter Certain Electronic Devices, Notice] (No-
tice of the Commission’s final determination finding a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337).
2. Id.
3. There is currently substantial debate surrounding whether such agreements to li-
cense, which are made between patent owners and standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”),
should be legally enforceable in court. See, e.g., Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Inter-
preting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. OF IT STANDARDS AND
STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 3 (Jan. – June 2011) (claiming “a FRAND obligation is solely the
result of a voluntary contract entered into by the patent owner on an identifiable date”); Jorge
L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for Frand Commitments and Other Patent Pledges,
UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23090
23 (proposing market reliance theory, a modified promissory estoppel approach, to enforce
FRAND commitments); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1925 (2002) (analyzing enforceability of FRAND com-
mitments under several legal theories). This Note will not address which legal doctrine(s)
might be used to enforce these agreements, but focuses solely on identifying appropriate judi-
cial remedies for infringement of patents subject to these agreements. Instead of debating
whether and how the terms of the agreement should be enforced, this back-end consideration
analyzes whether courts should honor the nature of the agreement.
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Technological standards are established norms or requirements used
within a given technical system. These standards reduce inefficiencies and
promote competition among manufacturers by permitting competing prod-
ucts to rely on compatible technology already owned by consumers.4 For
example, television manufacturers can now focus on improving the televi-
sion itself rather than on convincing consumers to buy a special outlet re-
quired for their unique power plug. Consumers, in turn, have the flexibility
of purchasing from various competitors—they are not locked in by a com-
mitment to Brand Z products simply because they previously installed a
Brand Z-compatible electrical outlet in their home. New standards are con-
stantly being developed where new articles of technology arise. Currently,
tech companies are developing “smart homes” featuring automated house-
hold appliances, and “connected cars” that can communicate with devices
both inside and outside the vehicle.5 New standards will be necessary to
allow these devices to communicate with each other—they must be capable
of speaking the same technological language. The technology used to create
the standard is often covered by patents, known as standard-essential patents
(“SEPs”), which grant their owners the right to exclude others from using
the claimed technology.
Technological standards are established by groups of private actors
known as standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”), who regulate the defini-
tion and use of these standards. SSOs typically require SEP owners to pledge
to license the patents under either reasonable or non-discriminatory
(“RAND”) or fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms up
front, before the technological standard is selected. This paper will refer to
these terms, which are often used interchangeably, jointly as “F/RAND.”
4. See Paul M. Bartkowski & Evan H. Langdon, Standard-Essential Patents: An In-
creasingly Contentious Issue at the U.S. International Trade Commission, WASHINGTON LE-
GAL FOUNDATION CONTEMPORARY LEGAL NOTE SERIES, July 2012, at 1, available at http://
www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/contemporarylegalnote/7-12Bartkowski_CLN.pdf.
5. For example, Apple is looking into “smart homes” that allow appliances to commu-
nicate with each other, reducing the affirmative efforts needed to maintain the home. Elise Hu,
Apple Makes a Play for ‘Smart Homes’ By Connecting Appliances, NPR (June 02, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/06/02/318223412/apple-makes-a-play-for-
smart-homes-by-connecting-appliances?ft=1&f=1001. Additionally, Google, among other
companies are developing “connected cars,” which rely on internet access and wireless net-
works to share information with devices inside the car (such as a smart phone) as well as
outside the car (such as other cars or traffic satellites). See Josh Constine, Why Google Made
Its Self-Driving Car So Darn Cute, TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/gal-
lery/google-self-driving-car/. This will be the premise for self-driving cars. European SSOs
have already begun setting standards for connected cars, mandating certain uniform networks,
drivers, and devices for communication. European Telecommunications Standards Institute,
CEN and ETSI deliver first set of standards for Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-
ITS), ETSI (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/753-2014-02-joint-news-
cen-and-etsi-deliver-first-set-of-standards-for-cooperative-intelligent-transport-systems-c-its.
The U.S. will need to soon follow suit.
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Despite commitments to license, SEP owners often bring suits alleging
infringement of these SEPs.6 With regard to remedies, patent holders may
seek either exclusionary relief or monetary damages against alleged infring-
ers. Both forms of relief have potential drawbacks when applied to F/
RAND-encumbered SEPs. Exclusionary relief, which prevents the other
party from practicing the infringing invention, may undermine the F/RAND
commitment by allowing the SEP owner to assert the patent without an offer
to license to the alleged infringer. Monetary damages, on the other hand,
may be viewed as a form of compulsory licensing where the court permits
the alleged infringer to continue practicing the patented invention at the cost
of a reasonable rate determined by the court.
As the importance of technological standards increases, the United
States must develop a uniform manner of facilitating and enforcing these
standards. In the United States, patent holders may choose to assert their
patents through two adjudicative forums—district courts and the USITC—
which appear to enforce F/RAND-encumbered SEPs in different ways.
Since 2006, district courts have shown increasing willingness to deny exclu-
sionary relief following a finding of patent infringement where the patent
owners have previously pledged to abide by an F/RAND commitment. The
USITC, however, has continued to promote exclusionary relief for F/RAND-
encumbered SEPs. Unlike district courts, the USITC only has the ability to
grant exclusionary relief: it cannot grant monetary damages. Since it can
provide no other remedy, the USITC is more willing than district courts to
provide exclusionary relief to protect patentees. In the hopes of attaining
exclusionary-type relief, many plaintiffs have been motivated to file their
patent infringement suits at the USITC rather than in district court. This
Note evaluates tensions created by the contrasting approaches taken by dis-
trict courts and the USITC regarding F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.
The different approaches of these two bodies will lead to inefficiency in
the patent system by leaving SEP owners uncertain about their rights, judges
confused about appropriate remedies, and potential industry entrants unwill-
ing to enter a field where uncertainty acts as a significant barrier to entry.
Accordingly, this Note proposes a general rule that both district courts and
the USITC deny exclusionary relief where the SEP owner has made F/
RAND commitments within an SSO setting.
Part I provides background on SSOs, SEPs, and the recent controversy
over judicially enforcing F/RAND commitments. Part II then provides back-
ground on the two adjudicative forums—district courts and the USITC—
through which SEP holders can enforce their patents. Additionally, Part II
describes the two remedies for patent infringement: exclusionary relief and
ongoing damages, in the effective form of a compulsory license. Part III
6. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing patent infringement claims involving F/RAND-encumbered SEPs).
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discusses recent district court and USITC cases, and highlights the differing
approaches in granting exclusionary relief for F/RAND-encumbered SEP
holders. Part III also provides examples of governmental pressures (via the
judicial, executive, and legislative branches) regarding the USITC approach
to exclusionary relief for SEPs. Finally, Part IV argues that the USITC and
district courts should establish a general rule denying exclusionary relief for
infringement of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.
I. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS AND
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
Patents gain value by becoming part of a technological standard because
all actors practicing the technology necessarily infringe those patents. Since
most patents have little or no economic value at all, many SEPs arguably
derive all of their value merely from being included in a standard. This Part
describes: (1) how standard-setting organizations set technological stan-
dards, thereby giving value to certain standard-essential patents; and (2) how
these patents particularly implicate patent and antitrust law concerns of pat-
ent holdup.
A. Standard-Setting Organizations and
Standard-Essential Patents
When new technologies are developed, inventors have countless poten-
tial specifications to choose from while developing products. Compatibility
standards optimize innovation and permit consumers to choose between dif-
ferent manufacturers’ products.7 There are various types of technological
standards, but this Note generally refers to “standardization” as any group-
established standard designed to achieve interoperability.8 Particularly in
modern technology areas involving complex communication networks and
processes, interoperability among complementary products promotes more
efficient use of resources.9 Interoperability removes barriers for consumers
choosing between products and overall simplifies use for these consumers.
Accordingly, standards lower product costs and increase competition.10 Stan-
dards also allow inventors of electronics to focus on innovation beyond the
standardized technology. Furthermore, less powerful inventors are able to
compete by joining the established network.
Technological compatibility standards are generally established through
standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”). SSOs consist of private industry
7. See, Lemley, supra note 3, at 1896–98.
8. Cf. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1898–1901 (examining the types of SSOs).
9. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATE-
MENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND
COMMITMENTS at 1, n.2 (Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guide
lines/290994.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Joint Policy Statement].
10. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F. 3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012).
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members that identify technological solutions, then negotiate and select a
single consistent technological standard.11 These members typically hold a
significant share of the relevant market, and will use this power to influence
others to follow the agreed-upon standard.12 Therefore, the power to estab-
lish standards places a significant responsibility on the SSOs to police
against unfair competition.
When determining the standard to establish, SSOs must consider what
patents currently cover the potential technological standard. A standard-es-
sential patent (“SEP”) is a patent that covers a component of the standard—
the SEP is infringed when a user practices any technology that incorporates
the standard. Some SEPs may not be necessary to simply practice the stan-
dard, but are otherwise necessary to commercially implement the technol-
ogy.13 Each SSO defines its own process for determining which patents are
essential. Although an independent evaluator typically provides ultimate
findings on essentiality, the private industry members within the SSO may
greatly influence this finding by defining the process. Since many SEPs de-
rive their value primarily from the fact that they have been chosen to be part
of the technological standard, a patent owner stands to gain significant
power if her patent is selected to be a SEP.
Patent law provides protection if a disclosed invention is new, non-obvi-
ous, and useful;14 however, the claimed invention need only be incre-
mentally novel. Accordingly, many patents can cover a particular form of
technology.15 For instance, consider the swipe-to-unlock feature on
smartphones. This is not a single feature—it is a combination of technologi-
cal components. At a basic level, this feature requires screen-sensing of a
touch and then software interpretation of this touch. Assume Inventor A
holds a valid patent on the screen-sensing technology, and Inventor B holds
a patent on the combination of sensing and interpreting the touch to “un-
lock” the screen. Inventor B does not have the right to sell a phone with the
swipe-to-unlock feature unless she can first license the screen-sensing patent
from Inventor A. In complex technologies like smartphones or smart cars,
there are hundreds of patents that may cover each component or standard.16
11. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1898.
12. See id.
13. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Patent Pools, OBLON SPIVAK, http://www
.oblon.com/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-patent-pools-and-standard-setting-organiza-
tions (answer to “What is an essential patent?”) (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
14. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012).
15. See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11-C-9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144061, at *179 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“[E]xpert Dr. Nettleton testified that there are ‘at
least hundreds’ of 802.11 standard-essential patents, and he did not disagree with an assertion
that there are ‘a couple of thousand patents’ covering the 802.11 standard.”).
16. In particular, when new patents are granted for advancements of existing technol-
ogy, the holder of the new patent still needs permission from the holder of the older patent in
order to practice the patented subject matter. There may be hundreds of these patents, creating
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If a single SEP holder refuses to grant license to use the claimed innovation,
an entire market may be suspended. Essentially, the patent “holds up,” or
prevents, players from manufacturing or selling in that industry.
B. The Patent Holdup Concern and F/RAND Commitments
In the United States, a patent confers upon its owner two valuable rights.
First is a property right—the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented subject matter.17 Second is
a liability right—the right to collect a “reasonable royalty” from anyone who
performs any of those actions.18 These two rights provide significant power
to the patent holder where others wish to practice the patented invention.
Accordingly, when patented technology is locked into a standard, patent
holdup becomes a concern.19
Patent holdup occurs when the patent owner has leverage over the pat-
ented product such that she can charge very high royalties (or impose other
unreasonable costs) to anyone looking to use the innovation. Once an SSO
establishes a standard, the entire industry will most likely conform to the
standard. Because SEPs are necessary to practice the standard, these patents
present an entry barrier for any entities looking to enter the field. The owner
of a SEP can greatly leverage its value by refusing to license, or obtaining
injunctions to block potential users. This potential monopoly power raises
antitrust-like concerns.20 Ultimately, this might lead to higher royalties,
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Alternatively, it might
lead to a delay in consumer access to the technology as companies strive to
innovate around this patent holdup.
SSOs aim to mitigate the patent holdup concern through their intellec-
tual property policies. Although these policies differ, most SSOs will require
SEP owners to agree in advance to license their patent before it is selected
for the standard.21 Although SSOs do not preemptively set specific licensing
much confusion about which patents are implicated by a technological use. This is a patent
thicket.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . . the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States”).
18. Id. § 154(d)(1)(A)(i) (“[A] patent shall include the right to obtain a reasonable roy-
alty from any person who . . . makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States the
invention.”).
19. Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard
Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Mar. 2013, at 2, 3, availa-
ble at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-13Spe
cial.pdf.
20. E.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2011 WL 7324582,
at *7–16 (W.D. Wisc. June 7, 2011) (alleging breach of contract, improper monopoly power,
patent misuse, and promissory estoppel where SEP owner that previously signed F/RAND
agreement with SSO later brought suit alleging patent infringement).
21. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1902.
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terms, they generally require the SEP owner to license the patent under “rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory” (“RAND”) terms or “fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms.22
Enforcing F/RAND commitments is beneficial to innovation because it
improves certainty surrounding the agreement in a way that strengthens in-
centives to participate in voluntary standard-setting activities. If a SEP
owner could recapture the enhanced market power it gained from becoming
a SEP owner by trying to recover terms more onerous on the licensee than
F/RAND, this would compromise the SSO’s ability to limit patent holdup
and promote the technological standard.
However, a number of challenges plague adjudicative enforcement of
F/RAND agreements. First, F/RAND itself is a vague standard because what
is “fair and reasonable” is highly subjective.23 This problem is compounded
where SSOs do not provide guidance on how to calculate F/RAND terms.24
In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington be-
came the first court to identify specific F/RAND royalty rates and term
ranges for a SEP in Microsoft v. Motorola.25 Although this decision indicates
that some courts are becoming willing to calculate F/RAND determinations,
it remains to be seen how other courts will act in the future.
Additionally, scholars and industry members have expressed concern re-
garding whether F/RAND commitments are even legally enforceable.26 For
example, the dominant theory for justifying enforcement of F/RAND com-
mitments is a contract-based theory.27 This theory views the patent holder’s
promise to a SSO to license to others under F/RAND terms as consideration
for the SSO to permit the SEP holder to participate in the standardization.28
This was the theory accepted in Microsoft.29 However, other scholars have
22. See id. at 1906, 1917.
23. The subjective nature of F/RAND may lead to significantly different costs and terms
for licensing a single patent to different parties.
24. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2012).
25. Nick Grimmer & Stefan M. Meisner, A First for FRAND: Federal Court in
Microsoft v. Motorola Sets FRAND Royalty Rates for Standard Essential Patents, MCDER-
MOTT WILL & EMERY (May 8, 2013), http://www.mwe.com/A-First-for-FRAND-Federal-
Court-in-iMicrosoft-v-Motorolai-Sets-FRAND-Royalty-Rates-for-Standard-Essential-Patents-
05-08-2013/; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
26. See, e.g., Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 877 (“Courts and commentators are divided as to
how, if at all, RAND licensing disputes should be settled.”); Kuhn, supra note 20, at 4; Mark
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1137–38 (2013).
27. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1910–11.
28. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1910.
29. See Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 884; For other examples of this theory being applied, see
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“By committing to
license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to license the [patent] to anyone
willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate
compensation for a license to use that patent.”); Brooks, supra note 3, at 3.
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argued that this theory is a poor fit for enforcing these commitments because
many F/RAND commitments would fail the simplified offer-acceptance-
consideration model.30 Many F/RAND commitments only require the SEP
holder to disclose her licensing terms to the SSO (rather than requiring the
SEP holder to actually license on certain terms).31 Because F/RAND com-
mitments are often brief sentences that fail to set out relevant terms, they
more closely resemble “agreements to agree,” which are not enforceable
under contract law.32 Since many others have already advocated for alterna-
tive legal theories to enforce F/RAND commitments, this Note will instead
focus on how adjudicative bodies can use judicial remedies to effectively
require holders of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs to license their patents.
II. ENFORCING PATENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
When a SEP holder alleges patent infringement, he typically seeks one
of two remedies: monetary damages or exclusionary relief. Monetary dam-
ages require the infringer to pay the SEP holder for its actions. Exclusionary
relief, on the other hand, is an equitable remedy designed to prevent future
infringement. If the adjudicative body grants this equitable remedy, the in-
fringer cannot practice the patented invention unless an independent agree-
ment is reached with the patent holder. This Note considers whether
monetary damages are appropriate when targeting future infringement, as
opposed to compensation for past infringement. In particular, should mone-
tary damages be granted instead of exclusionary relief, even where it might
be seen as a form of compulsory licensing?
In the U.S., a patent holder has the choice to enforce her patent in two
forums: First, the patent holder may bring a suit in district court to remedy
situations where a party has (without the permission of the patent holder)
made, used, sold, or attempted to sell an article covered by the patent in the
United States.33 Second, the patent holder may bring a suit in the United
States International Trade Commission (“USITC”) to prevent parties from
importing products that will infringe the patent upon arrival in the United
States. Patent owners may file parallel suits in both forums.34 The Federal
Circuit has the power to review cases from both of these adjudicative fo-
rums, but so far has permitted them to retain their different standards and
30. See Contreras, supra note 3, at 17; Jay P. Kesan and Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s
Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 280
(2014) (arguing for a servitude theory for FRAND commitments).
31. Contreras, supra note 3, at 20.
32. See Contreras, supra note 3, at 52–54.
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 281 (2012).
34. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Inter-
est, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27 (2012) (citing Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An
Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (explaining that patentees do so approximately two-thirds of the time).
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approaches. An important difference between the two bodies is the availabil-
ity of remedies. While district courts may grant either exclusionary or mone-
tary relief, the USITC can only grant exclusionary relief. District courts have
recently begun denying exclusionary relief after finding infringement of
F/RAND-encumbered SEPs, relying instead on ongoing monetary dam-
ages.35 However, the USITC has adhered to granting exclusionary relief in
these cases.
This Part focuses on the policy surrounding the two remedies where the
infringement claims involve F/RAND-encumbered SEPs, and generally
compares the remedy approaches of district courts and the USITC.
A. Equitable and Legal Remedies in District Courts
In the U.S., patents are granted as part of an innovation bargain—a pat-
ent holder gains a temporary right of exclusivity in exchange for disclosing a
novel invention.36 Although the right to exclude may temporarily forestall
innovation in that technological area, that right is offset in the long term by
the benefits of the incentive to innovate. Under this innovation bargain, the
right to exclude others is a fundamental feature of a patent. A patent owner
may enforce her patent by bringing an infringement suit in district court.37
All district court rulings are subject to review by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”). If a court finds ongoing patent
infringement, it may offer one of two remedies: First, it may issue exclusion-
ary relief in the form of an injunction, preventing further use or sale of the
infringing device.38 Second, it may establish monetary damages in the form
of ongoing royalties.39 In the situation of SEPs subject to F/RAND commit-
ments, both of these remedies implicate serious policy concerns.
35. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012) (discuss-
ing inappropriateness of injunctive relief in RAND cases); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869
F. Supp. 2d 901, 914, 922–23 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (denying exclusionary relief after finding patent
infringement), aff’d in relevant part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
36. Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor after Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315 (2004); 2013 Joint Policy Statement,
supra note 6, at 1–2 (“The patent system promotes innovation and economic growth by pro-
viding incentives to inventors to apply their knowledge, take risks, and make investments in
research and development and by publishing patents so that others can build on the disclosed
knowledge with further innovations. These efforts, in turn, benefit society as a whole by dis-
seminating knowledge and by providing new and valuable technologies, lower prices, im-
proved quality, and increased consumer choice.”).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
38. What remedies are available for patent infringement?, NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/enforcing-patent-faq-29148-2.html (last visited Dec. 2,
2014).
39. Id.
Fall 2014] District Courts Versus the USITC 179
Until 2006, district courts routinely issued injunctions upon a finding of
patent infringement.40 This gave the patent owner significant leverage in any
potential future licensing negotiations. Consider the policy surrounding ex-
clusionary relief for SEPs: On one hand, the right to exclude others is a
fundamental aspect of the patent law’s ability to provide an incentive to
innovate. This is precisely the power that exclusionary relief provides. On
the other hand, a SEP owner may gain too much power if this right to ex-
clude is absolute. The SEP gains significant value by becoming part of the
standard; in return, the right to exclude may need to be weakened in order to
permit other players to enter the field.
However, in the 2006 case eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Su-
preme Court held that courts should not immediately issue an injunction
following a finding of patent infringement.41 Instead, it required courts to
apply the traditional judicial four-factor test for exclusionary relief, wherein
a court may deny an injunction if it would best serve the public interest.42
After eBay, district courts have the discretion to grant injunctions only after
considering whether: (1) the plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm; (2) legal
remedies (such as monetary damages) are inadequate to compensate for the
injury; (3) the balance of hardships associated with exclusionary relief favor
the plaintiff; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed by issuing the
injunction.43
Monetary damages have long been a popular remedy to compensate for
past infringement activity. However, post-eBay, a court may also award
monetary damages in lieu of exclusionary relief to address ongoing or future
patent infringement. When a court or another adjudicative forum finds patent
infringement but refuses to grant an injunction, it ultimately requires the
infringer to pay ongoing royalties in exchange for continuing to infringe the
patent. Since, by initiating the suit, the patent owner has expressed unwill-
ingness to allow the infringer to practice the patented invention (at least
under previously negotiated terms), this court-imposed remedy can be
viewed as a form of compulsory patent licensing.
This pseudo-compulsory licensing approach opposes the general Ameri-
can patent policy against compulsory licensing. Recall that the right to ex-
clude is a primary right of a patent holder. However, there may be
circumstances where the public interest makes it necessary for a government
to suspend the exclusionary right, allowing others to infringe the patent.44 If
40. E.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir.
1989)(“It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been ad-
judged, absent a sound reason for denying it.”).
41. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
42. Id. at 390.
43. Id. at 392.
44. For example, the 2001 Doha Declaration permitted compulsory licensing for essen-
tial medicines by World Trade Organization members in order to protect the public health.
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the government suspends the exclusionary portion of the patent right, the
patent holder’s right to collect damages comes into play. The government
may effectively force the patent holder to allow others to practice the pat-
ented invention in exchange for an established royalty rate. The United
States tends to avoid this practice, known as compulsory licensing, based on
policy reasons to promote a free market.
Since the United States prioritizes a free market economy, it has consist-
ently advocated for strong intellectual property protection.45 Many countries
throughout the world permit some form of compulsory patent licensing;46
however, the United States has historically been very reluctant to require
involuntary licenses of patents.47 Statutory compulsory licensing of patents
in the United States is “virtually nonexistent.”48 Although Congress has, on
rare occasions, passed legislative acts establishing statutory compulsory li-
censing for patents, that compulsory licensing has been strictly limited to
specific circumstances and particular subject matter.49 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment has rarely granted compulsory licenses under these statutes.50 Dis-
trict courts also consistently note the United States’ aversion to compulsory
patent licensing.51 For example, in 1980, the Supreme Court observed that
Ellen F. M. ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seat-
tle, Doha and Beyond, in ECONOMICS OF AIDS AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS CARE IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 39, 41 (Jean-Paul Moatti et al. eds., 2003).
45. See id.; VICTORIA A. ESPINEL, OFFICE OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2010 JOINT
STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT 4 (2010) (“Strong enforcement of
intellectual property rights is an essential part of the Administration’s efforts to promote inno-
vation and ensure that the U.S. is a global leader in creative and innovative industries.”). The
U.S. is more willing to apply compulsory licensing of copyright. JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN
M. MCJOHN, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.03(2)(b) (Law Journal Press
2014)(1994).
46. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
30, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994); DRATLER, supra note
45, at § 3.03.
47. DRATLER, supra note 46, at §§ 3.01–3.06.
48. DRATLER, supra note 46, at § 3.03(2)(a).
49. Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States:
Good in Theory, but Not Necessary in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 41, 41
(1990) (“Although some forms of compulsory licensing exist in the United States, such invol-
untary licensing has been limited to specific circumstances and particular patented subject
matter.”); see also James Packard Love & Tim Hubbard, Recent Examples of the Use of Com-
pulsory Licenses on Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, May 6, 2007, available at http://
keionline.org/content/view/41/1 (stating that the US has established compulsory licenses for
essential medicines, such as Tamiflu, for treating a potential avian flu pandemic, or technologi-
cal devices to avoid anticompetitive practices, such as requiring Microsoft to license certain
protocols needed to create products interoperable with Microsoft Windows).
50. See Lauroesch, supra note 49, at 54–56.
51. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 & n.21 (1980).
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“compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system [ . . . ] it has often
been proposed, but it has never been enacted on a broad scale.”52
B. Equitable Remedies at the USITC
SEP owners have a second forum through which to enforce their pat-
ents—the USITC. The USITC is “[a]n independent, quasi-judicial federal
agency” that regulates imports into the United States.53 Under Section 1337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Section 337”), the USITC can prevent importa-
tion of items that infringe American patents, trademarks, or copyrights.54
Although Section 337 broadly prohibits “unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts” in the importation of articles, it is primarily used today for intel-
lectual property infringement claims.55 If the USITC finds infringement, it
can grant exclusionary remedies to the patent owner.56
After a Section 337 investigation is instituted, an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) holds an evidentiary hearing and issues an Initial Determina-
tion on the merits of the case.57 This decision may be petitioned for review at
the USITC, which may result in a Final Determination.58 Final Determina-
tions are reviewed by the Federal Circuit.59 Alternatively, the President has
the power to overturn USITC decisions.60 The President may exercise this
power through the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”).
There are several key differences between district courts and the USITC.
One important distinction is that the USITC can only affect goods that are
being imported.61 Since many goods covered by U.S. patents are imported
from other countries, the USITC can reach nearly as many goods as a district
court.62 However, the only remedies the USITC can offer are in the form of
equitable relief—Section 337 only authorizes the USITC to grant cease and
52. Id.
53. About the USITC, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www
.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
55. See ITC Section 337 Patent Litigation, FINNEGAN, http://www.finnegan.com/ITC-
Section337PatentLitigationPractice/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (“Ninety percent of Section 337
cases involve patent infringement disputes, and most of them concern complex technology.”).
56. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, USITC Pub. No. 4105, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at 24 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.usitc
.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
57. Id. at 20.
58. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.43–210.45 (2014); id. at 23.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (2012).
61. Doris Johnson Hines & J. Preston Long, The Continuing (R)evolution of Injunctive
Relief in the District Courts and the International Trade Commission, IP LITIGATOR, January/
February 2013, available at http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?
news=3aad1da2-08a9-4f14-a147-611b1e39ff75 (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
62. Id.
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desist orders or exclusion orders (limited or general).63 This has two major
implications. First, although the practical effect of this relief may be identi-
cal to an injunction issued by a district court, exclusion orders are legally
distinct from judicial injunctions.64 This technical distinction permits the
USITC and district courts to create separate standards for essentially the
same form of equitable relief.65 Second, unlike district courts, the USITC
cannot require an infringer to pay damages to the patent owner.66 If the
USITC denies exclusionary relief, the infringer faces no consequences for
the importation.67 However, after the goods have been imported and sold or
used in the U.S., the infringer may be liable in district court for
infringement.68
After finding infringement, the USITC issues an exclusionary order un-
less the statutory public interest factors dominate.69 These statutory factors
require the USITC to consider the order’s effect on “the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the produc-
tion of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers.”70 However, the USITC has not given these factors much
weight in the past. Accordingly, it rarely finds the public interest factors
outweigh the need for an exclusionary order.71 In fact, there have been only
three instances where the USITC refused to grant exclusionary relief after
finding patent infringement.72 None of these refusals have been based on
F/RAND agreements for SEPs.73
In 2010, the Federal Circuit held that the eBay framework for exclusion-
ary relief does not apply to the USITC exclusionary remedies.74 In effect, the
Federal Circuit prevented the USITC from considering arguments for deny-
ing exclusionary relief that are not premised on the statutory public interest
factors.75 This holding emphasized the dichotomy between the two adjudica-
63. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d),(f) (2012).
64. Hines & Long, supra note 61 (claiming that “the practical effect of the relief that
can be awarded by the ITC is almost identical to that of an injunction issued by a district
court”).
65. See Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Given the differ-
ent statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commission in Section 337 actions and before
the district courts in suits for patent infringement, this court holds that eBay does not apply to
Commission remedy determinations under Section 337.”).
66. Chien & Lemley, supra note 34, at 28.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
70. Id.
71. Chien & Lemley, supra note 34, at 19–20.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 21–23.
74. Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“eBay does not apply
to Commission remedy determinations under Section 337.”).
75. Id. at 1360 (upholding Commission’s decision to ignore a fact as weighing against
relief because “such proceeding is not explicitly listed as a public interest factor”).
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tive bodies’ willingness to grant exclusionary relief. Although both the Sec-
tion 337 statute and the judicial four-factor exclusionary relief test involve
consideration of the public interest, the USITC’s approach is less friendly to
the infringer.76 Because the USITC generally believes enforcing patents is in
favor of public interest, it still favors the patent holder within this public
interest analysis.77 The Federal Circuit, which has the power to review
USITC decisions, has permitted the USITC’s approach.78
Critics of exclusion orders argue that allowing exclusionary relief for
SEPs will undermine SSOs’ development of technological standards.79
Under this view, potential licensees will fear being bullied into unfair licens-
ing terms and therefore avoid joining the technological standard.80 This may
negatively impact competition and consumer welfare by destroying the effi-
ciency benefits of SSOs.81 However, proponents of exclusion orders argue
that patent owners would not be willing to enter into F/RAND commitments
unless exclusion orders are available because otherwise infringers would
have no incentive to license.82 Additionally, rejecting exclusionary relief at
the USITC level would leave the patent holder without a remedy at the end
of trial. As previously discussed, the USITC can only grant exclusionary-
type relief.83 If the USITC chooses not to impose this relief, the patent
holder can gain no remedy from the forum. Therefore, proponents note that
the USITC is likely reluctant to “condemn itself to seeming irrelevance.”84
III. HOW BINDING IS A F/RAND COMMITMENT IN
DISTRICT COURTS AND THE USITC?
How should adjudicative bodies consider SEP owners that have pledged
to abide by F/RAND commitments? Should a SEP owner’s F/RAND com-
mitment within an SSO constitute a legal obligation to license that patent?
Scholars and courts tend to find that F/RAND commitments should be le-
gally enforceable, but disagree about which legal theory is most applicable.85
76. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 34, at 18–20.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 29 (citing Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (“The
legislative history of the amendments to Section 337 indicates that Congress intended injunc-
tive relief to be the normal remedy for a Section 337 violation and that a showing of irrepara-
ble harm is not required to receive such injunctive relief.”).
79. Hines & Long, supra note 61, at 6 n.83–84.
80. Id.
81. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 4, at 1.
82. Hines & Long, supra note 61, at n.84.
83. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, USITC Pub. No. 4105, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at 24 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.usitc
.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
84. Chien & Lemley, supra note 34, at 29.
85. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Courts and
commentators are divided as to how, if at all, RAND licensing disputes should be settled.”);
Kuhn et al., supra note 19, at 4; Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
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Instead of adding to the debate over whether courts can compel SEP owners
to license their patents on the front end, this Part explores enforceability on
the back end. Should adjudicative bodies refuse to grant exclusionary relief
for infringement of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs? As previously discussed,
refusing to grant exclusionary relief effectively forces the SEP owner to li-
cense its patent(s) to the infringer [without requiring the adjudicative body to
select a legal theory for enforcement]. This Part compares the application of
exclusionary relief and monetary damages under these special
circumstances.
This issue has recently gained some attention. In 2013 and 2014, both
the Federal Circuit and USITC held that there is no per se rule against grant-
ing exclusionary relief for F/RAND-encumbered SEPs. However, these two
forums have varied greatly in practice. Since eBay, district courts have re-
peatedly denied exclusionary relief in such cases, while recent USITC rul-
ings indicate the Commission will continue to offer exclusionary relief upon
finding patent infringement. However, the USITC approach may be chang-
ing. In 2013, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) disapproved a
USITC limited exclusion order against a F/RAND-encumbered SEP on pol-
icy grounds. Although the USTR did not have the power to overturn the
USITC’s legal claim that there is no per se rule against exclusionary relief
for SEPs, this letter is likely to strongly influence the USITC’s future rul-
ings. Additionally, a number of other executive branch agencies and legisla-
tors have recently advocated for the USITC to reconsider exclusionary relief
for infringement of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.
This Part considers existing legal approaches to exclusionary relief for
infringement of F/RAND-encumbered patents and highlights policy consid-
erations regarding this issue. First, this part evaluates the divergent views on
the binding nature of F/RAND commitments at the district courts and the
USITC. Second, this Part evaluates recent district court and USITC ap-
proaches regarding exclusionary relief for F/RAND-encumbered SEPs. Fi-
nally, this Part evaluates additional views recently provided by members of
the Legislative and Executive Branches regarding the current USITC
approach.
A. Rejection of a Per Se Rule against Exclusionary Relief
for F/RAND-Encumbered SEPs
Both district courts and the USITC have acknowledged policies in favor
of enforcing F/RAND agreements. However, under the district courts’ eBay
framework and the USITC’s Section 337 standards, these bodies have
clearly stated there is no per se rule against exclusionary relief for F/RAND-
encumbered SEPs.
Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1923–27 (2002) (analyzing enforceability of
FRAND commitments under several legal theories).
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In the 2014 case Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., the Federal Circuit over-
turned a district court to hold that there is no per se prohibition against ex-
clusionary relief for F/RAND-encumbered SEPs under the eBay standard
applied by district courts.86 At the district court level, Judge Richard Posner
had denied exclusionary relief where Motorola claimed Apple infringed va-
rious Motorola patents, including an SEP.87 Posner explained his reasoning
for a per se rule against granting exclusionary relief as follows: “[b]y com-
mitting to license its patent on F/RAND terms, Motorola committed to li-
cense the [patent] to anyone willing to pay a F/RAND royalty and thus
implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a li-
cense to use that patent.”88 Although Judge Posner did not directly address
whether the F/RAND commitment was legally binding, this statement im-
plied that the commitment was sufficiently binding within a remedy analysis
to be perceived as an agreement to license. Judge Posner further reasoned
that “[a] compulsory license with ongoing royalty is likely to be a superior
remedy in a case like this [involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs].”89
Although the Federal Circuit overturned the per se approach against in-
junctions for F/RAND-encumbered SEPs, it ultimately upheld denial of the
injunction, finding insufficient evidence that monetary relief would provide
inadequate compensation.90 While the court acknowledged “Motorola’s
FRAND commitments are certainly criteria relevant to its entitlement to an
injunction,” it held that these commitments were to be analyzed within the
eBay framework.91 However, the Federal Circuit did highlight that “[a] pat-
entee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing ir-
reparable harm.”92 Furthermore, the court recognized that an injunction may
be justified where the infringer “unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty.”93
In June 2013, the USITC similarly rejected a per se prohibition against
exclusionary relief for infringement of F/RAND-encumbered patents in Cer-
tain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Porta-
ble Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers (“Certain
Electronic Devices”).94 Nevertheless, the USITC issued a limited exclusion
86. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To the extent
that the district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs, it erred.”).
87. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 913–14, 918 (holding generally that injunctive relief is unavailable for
FRAND-encumbered SEPs). However, this rule was overturned by the Federal Circuit upon
appeal. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1331.
90. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1331–32.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1332.
93. Id.
94. Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable
Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, (Pub. Ver-
sion), at 111 (July 5, 2013) (Final Opinion) [hereinafter Certain Electronic Devices, Final].
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order after finding Apple products infringed a Samsung SEP subject to
F/RAND obligations.95 In this case, Samsung argued that exclusionary relief
should generally be available against unwilling licensees, while Apple ar-
gued that such relief should be waived for virtually all F/RAND-encumbered
patents.96 The Commission sided with Samsung, holding that Samsung’s
F/RAND declarations did not preclude exclusionary relief.97
Within this decision, the Commission emphasized that the statutory pub-
lic interest factors in Section 337(d)(1) have limited scope and considered
each factor separately.98 First, the Commission dismissed the “public health
and welfare” factor because withholding the infringing devices would not
harm the public.99 Second, the Commission dismissed the “competitive con-
ditions” factor because no competitive articles were being produced in the
United States at the time.100 Third, the Commission dismissed the “competi-
tive conditions” factor because even excluding the infringing smartphones
and tablets would leave a wide variety of other smartphones and tablets for
sale in the U.S.101 Finally, the Commission dismissed the “effect on U.S.
consumers” factor because it was convinced that consumers and carriers
would still have similar options that are comparable in price and features to
the excluded infringing devices.102 However, this type of analysis employed
by the Commission fails to recognize that the reason alternative devices have
similar function and features are due, at least in part, to manufacturers’ reli-
ance on standardized technology.
One year previously in 2012, the USITC had rejected a per se prohibi-
tion against exclusionary relief for infringement of F/RAND-encumbered
patents under Section 337 standards in Certain Gaming and Entertainment
Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof (“Certain Gaming”).
In this case, Motorola sought Section 337 relief for importation and sale of
Microsoft’s Xbox, asserting that Microsoft infringed five patents—four of
95. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 3.
96. Newly-Public Letter to ITC Shows Lawmakers’ Concern Over Standard-Essential
Patent Issues, ESSENTIAL PAT. BLOG (June 12, 2013), http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/
2013/06/newly-public-letter-to-itc-shows-lawmakers-concern-over-standard-essential-patent-
issues.
97. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 3 (“Samsung’s FRAND decla-
rations do not preclude that remedy.”).
98. Certain Electronic Devices, Final, supra note 96, at 108 n. 21 (“The public interest
factors set forth in section 337(d)(1) are not public policies that the Commission seeks to
promote through its orders. Instead, they are statutory criteria that may indicate at the remedy
state of a section 337 investigation that ‘articles should not be excluded from entry.’”).
99. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 109 (“No party or public com-
menter raises an argument that excluding the iPhone4 and iPad 2 3G would have an adverse
effect on the public health and welfare.”).
100. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 109.
101. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 110.
102. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 110–11.
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which were subject to RAND commitments.103 Microsoft attempted to assert
these RAND agreements as giving rise to equitable defenses.104 Since these
facts were asserted as defenses, the ALJ did not consider the statutory public
interest factors. Ultimately, the ALJ found that Motorola’s “unilateral assur-
ances” to the SSOs to provide RAND licenses were insufficient to create a
judicially enforceable obligation to license, such that the USTIC should be
prevented from issuing exclusionary relief.105 The ALJ concluded that the
USITC retained its ability to issue Section 337 exclusionary relief remedy
regardless of any RAND commitments made within an SSO.106 Although the
USITC remanded the investigation,107 the investigation regarding the SEPs
ended when Motorola entered into a consent order with the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”).108
B. Granting Exclusionary Relief in District Courts
and USITC, in Practice.
Since eBay, the rate at which district courts grant exclusionary relief
after finding patent infringement has fallen from about 95% to about 75%.109
In particular, many of the cases where courts imposed a pseudo-compulsory
license have involved SEPs.110 The USITC, on the other hand, has not wa-
vered in granting exclusionary relief.111 Although both bodies have stated
that there is no per se prohibition against exclusionary relief for infringement
of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs, district courts have turned away from issu-
ing injunctions while the USITC has continued to issue exclusion orders in
these cases.
103. Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, & Components Thereof Ini-
tial Determination, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, (Pub. Version), at 282 (May 10, 2012) (Final on
Violation) (hereninafter Certain Gaming, Initial).
104. Certain Gaming, Initial, supra note 103, at 284. These asserted defenses included
“subordination of equity,” “implied license,” “implied waiver of the right to seek equitable or
exclusionary remedies,” as well as “equitable estoppel.”
105. Certain Gaming, Initial, supra note 103, at 290–91.
106. Certain Gaming, Initial, supra note 103, at 292.
107. Certain Gaming and Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-752, 77 Fed. Reg. 40082, 82–83 (June 29, 2012) (Notice of the Commis-
sion’s determination to review a final initial determination finding a violation of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337).
108. Certain Gaming and Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-752, 78 Fed. Reg. 32690 (May 31, 2013) (Termination).
109. Chien & Lemley, supra note 34, at 9.
110. Hines & Long, supra note 61, at 5.
111. Hines & Long, supra note 61, at 5 (explaining how different equitable relief ap-
proaches between federal courts and USITC have led to increasing popularity of USITC with
plaintiffs).
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1. Exclusionary Relief at the District Courts
District courts appear to focus on the irreparable harm factor of the eBay
analysis to deny exclusionary relief for infringement of F/RAND-encum-
bered SEPs. Even as the Federal Circuit overturned the per se prohibition in
Apple v. Motorola, it ultimately upheld the district court’s denial of exclu-
sionary relief where Motorola claimed Apple had infringed various Motorola
patents, including an SEP.112 However, the Federal Circuit focused on the
irreparable harm factor of eBay, rather than the public interest factor. At the
district court level, Judge Posner briefly discussed the balance of hardships
to each of the parties, and only briefly focused on the public interest factor to
criticize “the harm that an injunction might cause to consumers who can no
longer buy preferred products because their sales have been enjoined, and
the cost to the judiciary as well as to the parties of administering an injunc-
tion.”113 The Federal Circuit similarly glossed over the public interest factor,
devoting more focus to the irreparable harm factor. First, the Federal Circuit
stated that “[a] patentee subject to FRAND commitments may have diffi-
culty establishing irreparable harm.”114 Additionally, the Federal Circuit ar-
gued that “[c]onsidering the large number of industry participants that are
already using the system claimed in the [standard-essential] patent, including
competitors, [the SEP owner] has not provided any evidence that adding one
more user would create such harm.”115 With regard to the public interest
factor, the Federal Circuit only briefly mentioned that “the public has an
interest in encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations, but
also in ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued.”116
As they turn away from exclusionary relief toward monetary damages
for future infringement, district courts have become more comfortable deter-
mining F/RAND rates for licensing standard-essential patents. In April 2013,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington became the
first U.S. court to identify specific F/RAND royalty rates and term ranges
for SEPs in Microsoft v. Motorola.117 This case involved SEPs owned by
Motorola relating to the H.264 video coding standard set by the International
Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) and the 802.11 WAN standard set by
112. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012)(“By committing to license its patent on F/
RAND terms, Motorola committed to license the [patent] to anyone willing to pay a F/RAND
royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license
to use that patent.”) Posner further reasoned that “[a] compulsory license with ongoing royalty
is likely to be a superior remedy in a case like this [involving F/RAND-encumbered SEPs].”
Apple, 869 F. Supp 2d at 914.
113. Apple, 869 F. Supp 2d at 921.
114. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Grimmer & Meisner, supra note 25; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No.
C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013).
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the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”).118 Motorola
had submitted numerous declarations to these SSOs stating it “will grant” or
“is prepared to grant” licenses to its SEPs under RAND terms.119 In a series
of orders, the district court sided with Microsoft, holding that Motorola’s
statements to the SSOs created “enforceable contracts between Motorola and
the respective standard-setting organization to license its essential patents on
RAND terms,” and that Microsoft was a third-party beneficiary of the con-
tract.120 After denying exclusionary relief for infringement of these patents,
the court identified specific RAND terms for these SEPs.121
In October 2013, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois followed suit in calculating its own RAND royalty rate for
standard-essential patents related to the 802.11 WAN standards set by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”).122 Although these
decisions indicate that courts are becoming willing to calculate F/RAND
determinations, it remains to be seen how other courts will act in the future.
2. Exclusionary Relief at the USITC
Unlike district courts, the USITC has continued to grant exclusionary
relief upon finding infringement of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs. In Certain
Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable
Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers (“Certain Elec-
tronic Devices”), the USITC issued a limited exclusion order after finding
Apple products infringed a Samsung SEP subject to F/RAND obligations.123
In this case, Samsung argued that exclusionary relief should generally be
available against unwilling licensees, while Apple, the alleged infringer, ar-
gued that a F/RAND agreement “per se precludes a determination of viola-
tion” under Section 337, which would automatically deny the SEP holder
exclusionary relief.124 In this Final Determination, the USITC rejected Ap-
ple’s argument, holding that any public interest considerations must be based
on the statutory language of Section 337.125 The dissent, authored by Com-
missioner Pinkert, however, applied the public interest factors in
118. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2012).
119. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. 904 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(“A typical declaration . . . provides, in relevant part: ‘The Patent Holder will grant a license to
an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on reasona-
ble terms and conditions to use the patented material necessary in order to manufacture, use,
and / or sell implementations of the above . . . International Standard.’”).
120. Id. at 1115.
121. Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *20.
122. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11-C-9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
123. Certain Electronic Devices, Notice, supra note 1, at 3.
124. Certain Electronic Devices, Final, supra note 94, at 111.
125. Certain Electronic Devices, Final, supra note 94, at 112. Furthermore, “[t]he statute
makes no distinction between patents that have or have not been declared to be essential to a
standard.” Certain Electronic Devices, Final, supra note 94, at 46.
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§1137(d)(1) to argue that the exclusionary relief should be denied.126 The
Federal Circuit upheld this USITC ruling.127
However, in August 2013, the USTR disapproved the USITC’s exclu-
sion order based on the policy considerations surrounding F/RAND-encum-
bered SEPs.128 When explaining this decision, the USTR emphasized that
“[l]icensing SEPs on F/RAND terms is an important element of the Admin-
istration’s policy of promoting innovation and economic progress and re-
flects the positive linkages between patent rights and standards setting.”129
Since the USTR’s power to review USITC orders is limited to policy (and
not legal analysis), the disapproval order did not address whether there
should be a per se rule against exclusionary relief.130
Since Certain Electronics Devices, the USITC has terminated three SEP
investigations without considering the F/RAND issue. In two of these cases,
the USITC found no infringement of the asserted SEPs.131 In the third case,
the USITC found the patent was not essential to the standard.132 With mount-
ing pressure from the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, it re-
mains to be seen how the USITC will approach future remedies regarding F/
RAND-encumbered SEPs.
126. Certain Electronic Devices, Final, supra note 94, at D1.
127. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 556 F. App’x 962 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
128. Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, to Irving A. Willaimson, Chairman
of the Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) at 3, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
08032013%20Letter_1.pdf (“Under Section 337, the President is required to [evaluate any
exclusionary orders issued by the USITC.] . . . The President may disapprove an order on
policy ground, approve an order, or take no action and allow the order to come into force upon
the expiration of the 60-day review period. This authority has been assigned to the United
States Trade Representative [USTR].”).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Alex Lawson, InterDigital Scraps ITC Patent Suit as LG Tries to Arbitrate,
LAW360 (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/500464/interdigital-scraps-itc-pat
ent-suit-as-lg-tries-to-arbitrate (claiming that the ITC found no infringement of asserted SEPs
in the InterDigital case); David Long, ITC Terminates LSI-Realtek 337 Investigation Without
Addressing RAND Issues, ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.essentialpatent
blog.com/2014/03/itc-terminates-lsi-realtek-337-investigation-without-addressing-rand-issues-
inv-no-337-ta-837/ (noting that the ITC found no infringement of SEPs in the LSI-Realtek 337
case).
132. David Long, ITC Issues Limited Exclusion Order Upon Finding Patent Was Not
Essential to JEDEC Standard, ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (May 1, 2014), http://www.essential
patentblog.com/2014/05/itc-issues-limited-exclusion-order-upon-finding-patent-was-not-essen
tial-to-jedec-standard-337-ta-501 (identifying that the ITC issued a limited exclusion order af-
ter finding the patent at issue was not a SEP for the JEDEC standard).
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C. Judicial, Executive, and Legislative Pressure
on the USITC Approach
Exclusionary relief regarding SEPs has become a hotly debated topic.
Recent actions by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the United
States government are pressuring the USITC to rethink its approach on
granting exclusionary relief to F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.133 Additionally,
district courts have begun restricting the USITC’s ability to provide exclu-
sionary relief for such patents.
In May 2013, a district court granted a preliminary injunction barring
defendants from enforcing any exclusionary relief obtained at the USITC
regarding two RAND-encumbered SEPs.134 This decision, the first of its
kind by a federal court, found that the SEP owner breached RAND licensing
obligations by failing to offer a license prior to filing a Section 337 action at
the USITC.135 Effectively, this decision barred the USITC from granting ex-
clusionary relief until the district court completes an evaluation on the de-
fendants’ RAND obligations.136 Although this decision does not ultimately
prevent the USITC from acting, it strongly indicates disapproval of USITC
exclusionary relief where the SEP owner is subject to F/RAND obligations.
Additionally, it illustrates that district courts may have significant influence
on the USITC’s ability to grant exclusionary relief for F/RAND-encumbered
patents.
Within the Legislative Branch, members of Congress have indicated dis-
satisfaction with the current USITC approach in ignoring the statutory public
interest factor in Section 337. For example, four U.S. Senators wrote a bipar-
tisan letter to the USITC Chairman during Certain Electronic Devices con-
cerning decisions regarding F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.137 In this letter, the
Senators asked the USITC to “carefully assess the substantial public interest
considerations,” and warned against allowing an SEP owner to secure exclu-
sion orders in breach of a F/RAND commitment.138 Additionally, two Repre-
sentatives have introduced a bill that would expand the public interest clause
within the USITC statute.139 Although this bipartisan effort is particularly
133. Although these views or approaches are not binding on the USITC, they illustrate
the will of the executive and legislative branches and may be persuasive to courts.
134. Realtek Semiconducts v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1009–10 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
135. Id. at 1010.
136. Id.
137. Letter from Senators Mike Lee, Amy Klobuchar, Jim Risch, and Mark Begich, U.S.
Senators, to Irving Williamson, Chairman of the Int’l Trade Comm’n (May 21, 2013), http://
www.essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/234/2013/06/337-TA-794-5-21-2013-
Senate-Letter.pdf (a bipartisan letter signed by Senators Mike Lee (R-UT), Amy Klobuchar
(D-MN), Jim Risch (R-ID), and Mark Begich (D-AK)).
138. Id.
139. H.R. 4763, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/
113th-congress/house-bill/4763/; Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2014: Removing Nonpractic-
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directed to limiting non-practicing entities (also known as “patent trolls”), it
ultimately argues for the USITC to begin utilizing the public interest factor
to evaluate competitive conditions in the United States.140
In the Executive Branch, federal agencies have weighed in. For exam-
ple, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) addressed the issue in its deci-
sion in In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.141 In this
investigation, the FTC evaluated whether Google had violated Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) regarding unfair meth-
ods of competition by seeking a USITC exclusion order against parties will-
ing to license its F/RAND-encumbered SEPs.142 The terms of this settlement
prevent Google from seeking injunctions on SEPs against any potential
licensees who are willing to enter into a license on F/RAND terms, but per-
mits injunctions where the potential licensee refuses such terms.
Additionally, in 2013, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
(“DOJ”) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is-
sued a joint policy statement regarding USITC grants of exclusion orders in
cases involving standard-essential patents. The USTR cited specifically to
this statement when explaining his decision to disapprove an exclusion order
in Certain Gaming Devices.143
In this joint policy statement, the USPTO and DOJ cautioned the USITC
against issuing exclusionary orders in situations involving SEPs, particularly
where the SEP owner has voluntarily pledged to follow F/RAND licensing
terms as part of the SSO agreement.144 The agencies worried that an exclu-
sion order denying access to SEPs would negatively impact “competitive
conditions in the United States” and “United States consumers” by reducing
the incentives to participate in SSOs.145 The agencies asserted that the appro-
priate remedy should be “made against the backdrop of promoting both ap-
propriate compensation to patent holders and strong incentives for
innovators to participate in standards-setting activities.”146
Through this policy statement, the agencies appeared to be pushing the
USITC away from its traditional bias in favor of the patent holder and to-
ward enforcement of F/RAND licensing agreements. The agencies acknowl-
edged that a USITC exclusion order is generally appropriate if an imported
ing Entities from the USITC’s Jurisdiction, PATENTLY-O (Jun. 3, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2014/06/removing-practicing-jurisdiction.html.
140. See H.R. 4763.
141. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, 2013 FTC LEXIS 96 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013).
142. Id.
143. Jay Jurata et al., White House Reins in ITC on Standard-Essential Patents, ORRICK
(Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Pages/White-House-Reins-In-
ITC-on-SEPs.aspx.
144. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 9.
145. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 8–9.
146. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 10.
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good is found to infringe a patent.147 However, the agencies noted that public
interest “may preclude the issuance of an exclusion order” in some cases,
and these factors should weigh more heavily than “mere lip service.”148 The
agencies continued to find that these public interest factors may lead the
USITC to either completely avoid an exclusion order or to delay the effec-
tive date of such an order.149
Nevertheless, the agencies emphasized that selecting an appropriate
remedy for infringed SEPs requires a fact-intensive analysis. Specifically,
the agencies argued that public interest considerations are likely to make an
exclusion order inappropriate where the infringer (1) is acting within the
scope of the patent holder’s F/RAND commitment and (2) is able and has
not refused to license on F/RAND terms.150 Where the SEP holder has vol-
untarily entered a commitment to license her patents on F/RAND terms, the
agencies believe money damages are preferable to exclusionary relief.151
IV. A GENERAL RULE AGAINST EXCLUSIONARY RELIEF FOR
F/RAND-ENCUMBERED SEPS
As illustrated in the previous Parts of this Note, the USITC and district
courts approach exclusionary relief for F/RAND-encumbered SEPs in con-
flicting ways. Clear guidance in the form of a more uniform approach would
discourage forum shopping by plaintiffs; avoid ambiguity in the law by pro-
viding consistent rules; and increase efficiency by providing greater cer-
tainty for judges, parties, and the public. Therefore, this Note proposes a
general rule that both district courts and the USITC should apply their re-
spective public interest factor to establish a general rule in favor of denying
exclusionary relief whenever a SEP owner has violated its F/RAND commit-
ments. District courts should continue to deny injunctions, but they should
do so by considering F/RAND commitments primarily within the public in-
terest prong of the eBay framework. The USITC should now base its denial
of exclusionary relief on the public interest factor of Section 337(d)(1). Al-
though this Note does not argue whether F/RAND commitments by a SEP
owner to a SSO should be viewed as a binding agreement to license that
patent, the related policy considerations support disfavoring exclusionary re-
lief as a remedy for F/RAND-encumbered SEPs. This rule should apply
147. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 2.
148. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 9–10.
149. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 10.
150. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 9.
151. 2013 Joint Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 9 (“In an era where competition and
consumer welfare thrive on interconnected, interoperable network platforms, the DOJ and
USPTO urge the USITC to consider whether a patent holder has acknowledged voluntarily
through a commitment to license its patents on F/RAND terms that money damages, rather
than injunctive or exclusionary relief, is the appropriate remedy for infringement.”).
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whenever the alleged infringer provides facts establishing a F/RAND com-
mitment, but should not require the creation of an affirmative defense.
A patent holder who has made a F/RAND commitment has altered the
expected “rights” conferred by a patent. The SEP holder’s voluntary com-
mitment shifts this innovation-incentivizing factor from the property right to
exclude toward the liability right to obtain a reasonable fee. Adjudicative
bodies should not be required to wait for evidence of patent holdup or con-
duct other fact-intensive inquiries before recognizing that the SEP holder has
violated her agreement. Although the USITC believes that enforcing patents
is in the public interest, it should also recognize that enforcing F/RAND
agreements is also in the public interest. As discussed in previous sections,
the Executive Branch has recently promoted this view at the USITC through
the actions of the FTC, USPTO, DOJ, and USTR.
The solution, therefore, is a two-step process that begins after the adju-
dicative body has found that patent infringement has occurred: First, the ad-
judicative body must identify whether the patent is subject to a F/RAND
obligation. Second, the adjudicative body must identify whether the patent
owner has breached this F/RAND obligation. The SEP holder should be per-
mitted some flexibility when enforcing F/RAND-sufficient terms. Courts
and the USITC should recognize that “fair and reasonable” are fact-intensive
inquiries and may be satisfied by a small range of values. However, SEP
holders should not be permitted to abuse this power. The Microsoft case
indicates that courts are capable of identifying F/RAND royalty rates and
terms. Although this may be a costly approach for the parties throughout a
tedious litigation process, giving district courts this power will motivate the
parties to settle, or negotiate a reasonable license.152
Once breach of a F/RAND obligation has been identified, the adjudica-
tive body should consider this factor as weighing strongly against a grant of
exclusionary relief within its public interest analysis. At the district courts,
this falls squarely within the public interest prong of the eBay framework. At
the USITC, this finding should weigh heavily within the “competitive condi-
tions” and “United States consumers” prongs of the Section 337(d)(1) public
interest analysis. Ignoring F/RAND obligations weakens the competitive
conditions within standards-dependent fields, ultimately shifting the costs
onto American consumers. Additionally, the USITC’s evaluation of the
“production of like or directly competitive articles” public interest factor
should be greatly tempered by the existence of a F/RAND agreement. Where
SEP holders place their patented technology within the standard, other in-
152. For example, in In re Innovatio, many parties settled after a district court reorga-
nized the traditional decision-making order and determined a RAND rate prior to investigating
infringement. Renata B. Hesse, Dep’t of Justice, A Year in the Life of the Joint DOJ-PTO
Policy Statement on Remedies for F/RAND Encumbered Standards-Essential Patents, at 11
(2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/304638.pdf; In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
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ventors are essentially required to use that technology to be competitive in
the market. Therefore, any likeness between competing articles due to this
agreement should not weigh in favor of granting exclusionary relief. Both
the USITC and the district courts have indicated unwillingness to apply a per
se rule against exclusionary relief in all cases involving F/RAND-encum-
bered SEPs. A per se rule would be overly broad, and may overly burden the
patent holder. For example, a potential licensee may unreasonably insist on
non-F/RAND terms. The SEP holder should not be punished for refusing
such a license. Similar to the FTC settlement agreement involving Google,
the rule proposed here is more limited than a per se rule, and should appeal
more broadly to adjudicative bodies.
If the USITC refuses to grant exclusionary-type relief, SEP holders can
still use district court to obtain damages. Since there is no per se rule, the
USITC will not be rendered powerless by this approach—it can still grant
exclusionary-type relief in appropriate situations. Additionally, the USITC
retains its value because it handles many other patent cases. As previously
discussed, the USITC sees relatively few cases involving SEPs, and many of
these never reach the exclusionary order question.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions from district courts and the USTIC have led to incon-
sistent approaches regarding exclusionary remedies where F/RAND-encum-
bered SEPs are infringed. Since the USITC’s only available remedy is
exclusionary relief, it has been reluctant to deny relief in such cases. How-
ever, where the SEP owner has previously agreed to license patents (under
F/RAND terms) in exchange for the benefits of owning a standard-essential
patent, the USITC should not be so reluctant to deny exclusionary relief.
Therefore, the district courts and the USITC should adopt a general rule
denying exclusionary relief for infringement of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs
whenever the patent owner has breached a F/RAND commitment made to a
SSO.
